Mechanically the work is exceedingly well arranged. The head notes are brief and to the point. Each volume is, in effect, a separate text book upon the particular subject treated, and is separately indexed. Over five thousand new cases have been examined, and reference is made to the Reporter systems, the Lawyers' Reports Annotated and the American reports.

W. F. C.

Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States. By Hannis Taylor, LL.D. The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, 1905. Sheep, pages lxvi and 1007.

This is an admirable treatise. In both conception and execution it may well be said to accentuate the high esteem in which its distinguished author is held. It will be indispensable to the Federal practitioner, and should prove of marked interest to all jurists and students of constitutional law and that unique tribunal, without a prototype in history, the Supreme Court of the United States. Following a discussion on the genesis of the Supreme Court, the volume is divided into six parts, entitled: Original Jurisdiction; Appellate Jurisdiction over Ordinary Federal Courts; Appellate Jurisdiction over Special Federal Courts; Appellate Jurisdiction over State Courts; the Great Writs; and Procedure in the Supreme Court. The rules of the Supreme Court and a valuable list of practical forms are appended.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the work—certainly the richest in philosophic interest—is the preface, which contains a résumé of the leading cases from the organization of the court to the present time; and indicates the process of development through which the most important aspect of that tribunal arose from the distinctively American invention known as constitutional limitations on legislative powers. Not until thirteen years after the organization of the Supreme Court was the first attempt made, in *Marbury v. Madison,* to put the stamp of nullity upon a national law, and not until twenty years after its organization was it sought, in *Fletcher v. Peck,* to nullify a state law, in both cases by reason of repugnancy to the Federal Constitution. The present powers of the Supreme Court are the gradual outcome of our political conditions, and the momentous results have been finally attained largely through judicial legislation. Dr. Taylor does not apprehend that judge-made law may eventually undermine the Constitution. He believes it to be an essential agency of government—an agency which "silently expanded and adapted the primitive and unelastic codes of Rome and England to the ever increasing wants of progressive societies."*

J. C. D.

* See Maine, Ancient Law, pages 23–27.